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Co-creation or collusion: The dark side of consumer narrative in qualitative health 
research 
 
Introduction 
Health, mental health and social care policy are dominated by the imperative of employing 
person-centred approaches. Policy has been reconfigured to specify the value of the voices 
and lived experiences of service users and patients, as well as that of working with them in 
collaborative partnership (King’s Fund, 2016; Nesta, 2016; NHS England, 2016). Such 
involvement of the ‘consumer’ is generally claimed to provide a counter-narrative to the 
psychiatric and medical paradigm of illness, instead offering one which ‘belongs to 
consumers-survivors, not to practitioners’ (Schiff, 2004:212). As health researchers, we 
consider such policy reform preferable to expertism; nonetheless we do question if such well-
intentioned, person-centred approaches are inherently ‘good’. Taking a critical and reflexive 
standpoint, we find ourselves asking: Is there a dark side to the inclusion and use of person-
centred approaches and what might be at risk in this pursuit of ‘voice’?  
 
To explore these questions further we offer a condensed, but critical, exploration of the 
current mental health and health and social care policy arenas, with a focus on how neoliberal 
policy generates particular discourses, which in turn shape research and practice. From this 
policy perspective, we then move to methodological and ethical concerns about ways in 
which collaborative and person-centred research can inadvertently reproduce the neoliberal 
agenda. We do this with a view to adding to current debates, particularly in qualitative 
interviewing, around power relations and positionality. 
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Informed by a Post-Foucauldian governmentality analysis (Marston & McDonald, 2006) we 
set about reimagining our current research into mental health narratives (author a) and 
psychosocial cancer care (author b).  Our reanalysis aims to explore the subtle workings of 
power and its imbrication with forms of knowledge. We pay attention to how particular sorts 
of participants are produced (in this case the mental health service user; the cancer patient) 
and how our research is complicit in this reproduction. We have become increasingly alarmed 
that even critically reflexive research runs the risk of perpetuating dominant discourses in 
health, as evidenced by the recovery and remission narratives, thereby contributing to the 
very problems we wish to resolve. We seek to explore these concerns here, and offer our own 
lived experiences as a cautionary tale. 
 
The Policy Context 
Consumerism as an ideology within UK health policy has been linked to the rise of 
managerialism in the National Health Service (NHS) during the 1980s.The drive toward 
‘patient-client’ participation foregrounded the ‘consumer voice’movement and private sector 
edicts of market forces, assessment and audit have underpinned the continued rise of  
managerialism (Loewenthal, 2002), and neo-bureaucracy (Harrison & Smith 2003), 
privileging technicism and performativity over basic trust in public sector professionals 
(O’Neill, 2002). 
 
The NHS and Community Care Act of 1990 is widely cited as the first UK legislation to 
establish a formal requirement for user involvement in service planning although historians of 
public health have described a heritage for public participation dating back 200 years 
(Gorsky, 2007).  The act enshrined key objectives of the government White Paper Caring for 
People (1990), which promoted the concept of the state as enabler, rather than provider, of 
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care through the application of privatisation. Subsequent policies in the early 1990s include 
the Patient’s Charter (Department of Health, 1991) and plans set out in Local Voices (NHS 
Management Executive, 1992) which aimed to make services more responsive to patients’ 
needs, stressing, however, consumerism rather than partnership. Patient and public 
involvement in healthcare was to become one of the central tenets of New Labour’s 
modernisation agenda. Its energetic acceleration by the subsequent Coalition Government 
paved the way for the current swingeing radical reforms and cuts to services under the 
Conservative government. This drive toward a particular version of healthcare was not 
confined to the UK; as a consequence of policy reform, user /patient/client voice are now part 
of policy and an expectation of practice across post-developed countries. So embedded an 
approach is it that the problems of participatory mechanisms of governance are well 
documented, including tokenism (obligatory consultation with minimal dispersed decision 
making power) and a co-option or incorporation of critics (Pilgrim, 2005). Cooke and Kothari 
(2002) suggest that policies seeking to promote public engagement are merely one part of a 
deeper mission of governance and social control.  
 
In this version of healthcare the individual is forefronted, unsurprisingly, as s/he is identified 
as a key cultural trope (Wacquant, 2012) of neoliberal ideology – with the consequent erosion 
of any sense of community or obligation to others (Bauman, 2007). The ‘active’ involvement 
of this individual in health care policy is very much part of the neoliberal package, with its 
crafted versions of community and volunteerism engineered to enable a shrinking welfare-
state presence (Brown & Baker, 2013).   
 
 
Policy shapes the research context 
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Much health research has, unintentionally, colluded in this shift toward individualism, albeit 
under the guise of participation, collaboration and co-production. An emphasis on ‘voice’ in 
particular, apprehending the discourse of activism ignited by the civil rights and user/survivor 
movements and struggles of the 1970s, is apparent throughout contemporary policy and  
practice guidelines. Such hijacking of language has been better conceptualised as examples of 
discursive elements becoming incorporated into chains removed from their original. Hall 
(2011) amongst others, has given account of how neoliberalism appropriates extensively from 
classic liberal ideas, giving them a ‘market’ inflection and conceptual revamp.  
  
Health research, much of it emanating also from the emancipatory agenda of the 1970s 
(Freire, 1970; Hubert, 2002) has developed a strong qualitative, first person narrative 
pedigree – and quite rightly. Part of a broader shift across disciplines to narrative knowing, 
such work has illustrated precisely how the personal is political, and exposed the micro of 
experience within complex social matrices (Andrews et al, 2013). 
 
The early health consumer movement was emancipatory in that it sought to challenge 
medical power, yet today the ways in which these voices are disseminated and find their way 
into policy and practice may not always be as equitable as is commonly assumed. In terms of 
policy, research that often painstakingly foregrounds the participant voice may well be 
contributing to the individualistic veneer of neoliberal policy being ‘person centred’ 
/collaborative/ participatory/democratic, while inadvertently leading to the loss of complexity 
of illness experience. A further outcome of this may be the sequestering of voice into a 
position where it can pose no threat; a ‘naturalising’ of the language of resistance, rendering 
the ideology opaque (Fairclough, 2010). This hijacking of language leaves actual ‘resistance’ 
discourse denuded, its voice neutered; a further loss of power of the ‘other’.  As Rose (1999) 
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argued, the capacity of the individual for action is thus used as a means to secure the aims of 
government. 
 
We continue to endorse the need for research to include the voices and experiences of 
participants and we do not suggest that narrative research inevitably leads to a reinforcing of 
languages of deficit; blame or victimhood. Neither do personal testimonials or blogs detailing 
illness necessarily fall prey to this. Barbara Ehrenreich’s famed ‘Welcome to Cancerland’ 
being a much heralded example of a first person rumination on the cancer journey which, far 
from succumbing to any discourse of blame, victimhood or deficit, defiantly makes a critical 
point about the ‘cult of pink kitsch’ and the ‘breast cancer paraphernalia’ with which our 
culture is saturated. 
 
We also acknowledge that practice, policy and theory are all strengthened by research, each 
informing the other to ultimately shape the ways in which we reproduce discourses and 
facilitate understanding ourselves as meaning-making subjects. Indeed, as researchers aligned 
to feminist onto-epistemological principles (Brown, Western and Author b, 2013), our own 
narrative work continues to point to the value of reflexive, first person interviews (Author a, 
2014) that function both to foreground voices otherwise marginalised and to provide what is 
seen by some as a resource on which people can draw as part of their re-scripting and 
narrative rebalancing.  Yet we find ourselves caught in a ‘wicked problem’; caught in the 
perennial tensions between public discourse and personal experience, asking what knowledge 
and experience is privileged (Finlay and Gough, 2003) and what complexities are  lost in this  
as we explore privately based knowledges and personal understandings and then reconstitute 
them within publicly based disciplinary knowledge.   Although we cannot hope to resolve 
‘wicked problems’ in our paper, nonetheless, we regard this dilemma, first highlighted by 
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Ribbens and Edwards in 1998 as more pressing than ever, as neoliberal ideals penetrate more 
deeply into the research agenda and as academic research becomes more entrenched in, part 
of, and beholden to their discourse.  
 
Methodology: 
We have employed a post-Foucauldian governmentality analysis to our recent research into 
mental health narratives and psychosocial cancer care ( Author b, Johnson, Dickson-Swift 
and Kenny, 2015;  Author b, Johnson, Dickson-Swift, McGrath & Dangerfield, 2015; Author 
b, 2010; Author b and Endacott, 2010; Author a, 2012, 2014:,2015; more specifically,  a 
‘realist governmentality’ approach (Stenson 2005, 2008) which attends to the ‘messy 
actualities of the empirical world’ (McKee, 2009:484).  Foucault defined governmentality as 
the `institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics' that 
support a particular rationale of power and apparatuses of security, with populations as their 
target (Foucault 1978: in Burchell et al. 1991: 102).  In this paper, we also offer a condensed 
view of the procedures of particular methodologies (first person narrative and 
phenomenology) with participants drawn from mental health service user groups and cancer 
psychosocial care respectively. Thus, a triangulation of post-Foucauldian governmentality 
analysis, combined with narrative and phenomenological interpretation, offered a rich, if 
complex, methodological approach. 
 
As our work encompasses multidisciplinary and multi methodological approaches, we 
nevertheless found our work situated within person-centred and socially-just epistemologies.  
Applying a critically analytic ‘meta-analysis’ to our own work offered a platform from which 
to examine our own potential collusion with neoliberal agendas, and ways we sought to 
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overcome this. This process allowed space for us to consider ‘the effects of power at the 
micro-level and the lived experience of subjection’ (McKee, 2009). 
 
We concede given Higher Education policy imperatives that researchers cannot eradicate 
embedded assumptions. However, working within that caveat we offer that reflexivity and 
rigour can ameliorate dilemmas and facilitate a move toward a more socially-just and 
inclusive standpoint. 
 
(i) Reflexivity  
To be reflexive is to be able to name and critique one’s own values and how these influence 
the design of research projects and the interpretation of findings (Chamberlain, 2015). But 
such self-awareness is not sufficient to ensure criticality; indeed within the psychosocial 
narrative research tradition that admits to unconscious processes in research (Hollway & 
Jefferson, 2000) the field (which for reasons of brevity is not discussed in this paper) 
becomes further ignited.  But we do, at this juncture posit that an ongoing and iterative 
process of reflexivity is required to remain ethical. It was in taking such a standpoint that we 
found ourselves troubled by research participants’ stories that spoke to self-shame and blame; 
to not coping. We were struck too by the pervasiveness of converse narratives; segments that 
repeated acts of ‘soldiering on; keeping smiling; and oh well...staying positive’; as well as 
narratives of ‘reason’: ‘I got cancer/schizophrenia for a reason/lesson/punishment’.  These 
recurring (and indeed polarised) themes seemed to pick up the individualistic and ‘victim-
blaming’ neoliberal discourse, through which participants unwittingly isolated themselves 
from the socio-political contexts of their lives. We became increasingly concerned that our 
research inadvertently reproduced and sedimented disempowered identities reinforcing 
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marginalisation and deficits, rather than offering inclusivity as promised by our person-
centred methods. 
 
Reflexive thinking was now leading us into an epistemological quandary of questions:  Were 
we in danger of catering to the dominant restitution narrative (Frank, 1995) and the idealised 
healthy body (white, male and abled) (Lupton, 1994)? Were we losing alternative narratives 
that depict the nuance of loss, the helplessness of illness and the ‘unspeakable’ pain of 
experience? Is it the role of the participants, arguably those already vulnerable and suffering, 
or ours as researchers, to reinterpret experiences?  Do we risk paternalism by such a stance? 
And does this reinterpretation say more about our own lived experience of the phenomena of 
our research; that is, in decentring the author, have we instead created a solipsistic 
recentering? Are we staying 'true' to their voice, and what, indeed, is truth anyway (Gadamer, 
1995). Or is being polite and affable more a social role, rather than a lived one; merely a 'face 
work' (Goffman, 1959; Little, Paul, Jordens and Sayers, 2002; Little, Jordens, Paul and 
Sayers, 2001) for the research interaction? Were we then, as researchers being politely 
agreeable, empathic indeed, in the mistaken belief we are ‘witnessing’ transformation, and 
are participants offering up a socially desirable role of, for example, positivity, recovery, or 
self-blame/responsibility? In short, how to decide on ‘truth’, authenticity and inauthenticity? 
 
Given the centrality of authenticity and its connection dominant narratives, to both the 
method and meaning of our paper, it is worth noting here that we use the term ‘authenticity’ 
in the Heideggerian sense (1927/1962). It is beyond the scope of this paper for a full 
discussion, suffice it to say that we consider authenticity/inauthenticity to be non-binary, not 
essentialist, and not fixed in time. Nonetheless, some narratives may be merely what is 
socially acceptable; relatively uncritical; perpetuate dominant ideologies and hamper 
alternative discourses. At worst, inauthentic narratives disrupt and damage, and serve to 
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reinforce deficit models. From a research perspective, we wished to interrogate such 
narratives, and consider the important concept of authenticity to be an epistemological, as 
much as an experiential, hazard. 
 
These questions raised ontological and epistemological uncertainties for the research process, 
as well as questions about the implementation of policy and practice. We were left unsettled 
about what we routinely co-create, wondering about the legitimacy, veracity, reliability and 
authenticity of this now much vaunted process of foregrounding patient voice and experience. 
 
(ii) Methods: Procedures 
We draw on findings from six (Author b et.al, 2015; Author b, 2010, Author b and 
Endacott, 2010; Author a, 2012, 2014, 2015) qualitative studies, all of which 
explored either the experiences of mental health service users or the psychosocial 
experiences of cancer survivorhood. Each study employed either narrative (author 
a) or Heideggerian phenomenology (author b) and was designed to elicit the 
voices and lived experiences of participants and explore existential aspects of the 
phenomena under inquiry. Each study placed great store in aspects of the 
interview setting that are deemed important to our locating ourselves as 
researchers with integrity and to enabling as authentic a first person narrative as 
possible. These include the development of rapport between interviewer and 
interviewee, inviting and sustaining free-flow, uninterrupted and unrushed stories 
of illness and allowing for the revision or withdrawal of narratives, with the aim 
of the interview itself potentially being a restorative experience for the participant 
(Frosh, 2002).  We maintained a reflexive standpoint, and encouraged mutuality 
of a shared dialogue, employing a critical and social justice approach to the 
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overall design of the studies. All research undertaken was ethically approved by 
the universities that hosted the work.    
 
We considered our methodologies, data sets and findings, although arising from 
separate studies, institutions and countries, to have some startling similarities. We 
scheduled a series of meetings and careful cross re-readings of our original data, 
with the following aims:  
 
(a) To expose our methodological assumptions about voice, lived experience and 
our role as researchers; and take deeper, critical account of overlooked 
asymmetrical power relations in the interview (Kvale, 2006)  
(b) To compare and contrast our data analysis techniques and processes with the 
aim of identifying assumptions, instances of asymmetrical power and collusive 
practice 
(c) To employ a post-Foucauldian analysis to our original data, in order to 
reconceptualise our findings. 
 
 
Findings: 
In questioning whether our own values-base as researchers, which values participants/ lived 
experience and subjectivity, is co-creation or collusion, we focus on three key issues and the 
ways we may be: 
(a) Normalising the inauthentic narrative within the interview/data collection process;  
(b) Validating the inauthentic narrative in findings/dissemination and co-creation ; 
(c)  Reinforcing and perpetuating the dominant ideologies 
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(a) Normalising the inauthentic narrative within the interview/data collection process; 
Within the psychosocial cancer care literature, there are assumptions of ‘hope and cope’ that 
shape the ways both people with cancer (this term is used to indicated people living with and 
beyond cancer and abbreviated to pwc) and the way practitioners describe their experiences. 
While respecting the right of pwc to represent their experiences in whatever ways they 
choose, conversely, the experience of cancer alone is not sufficient to provide a critical voice.  
There are many examples of participants privileging mind over matter in magical ways, 
perpetuating Cartesian dualism, and an embedded assumption that positivity can ward off 
disease progression. At times there is the implication that those that die did not try hard 
enough, or that one ’s self is to blame. These assumptions are understandable given the 
every-day ‘mind-over-matter’ discourse about physical and mental health. There are clear 
similarities here with the recovery and self-help literature in mental health, where staying 
positive is given paramount importance – relegating voiced experiences of not feeling 
positive, to a lesser elsewhere. Both our data sets contained numerous expressions of this 
positivity that in subsequent readings appeared to allow no room for engagements with pain 
far less the possibilities of death: 
 I am very strong willed 
 I have a lot of determination, I am very independent. 
 It’s up to me in the end, to fight this, I can do that… 
Therapy had me going round in circles, dissecting The Problem (makes scare marks) – I’m 
determined to get beyond that, put it all behind me 
There is also, at times, dichotomous thinking; one must remain strong, positive and 
determined, or ‘lose the metaphoric fight (Sontag, 1990), as implied: 
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So I think you can be miserable, you can be a victim, or you can be a fighter and get on with 
it 
It’s up to you. You can sit around moping or you can get up, dress up and show up… 
 
When in the midst of suffering and uncertainty, it is understandable that unfounded 
explanations create a comforting certainty: 
 
All of the chemical and all of the pesticides and additives in our food, is a very big cause of 
contribution to a lot of cancer 
 
 they’re finding out more and more, with brain scans, and all that….that it’s (depression)  a 
chemical thing… 
 
From a methodological aspect, to take these comments and examples at face value overlooks 
the social nature of interview data collection, and the need of pwc to save ‘face’ (Little et.al, 
2001; Goffman, 1959) and the pressure on mental health survivors to be seen as coping and 
‘in recovery’ a nebulous state increasingly defined as one in which service users 
‘acknowledge the inappropriateness of their ‘negative’ beliefs, values and behaviors’ (Harper 
& Speed, 2012:12). It is more socially acceptable to be healthy with food choices, for 
example, positive and agentic, effectively pushing out any chaos narrative (Frank, 1995), and 
the representation of alternative realities. That these stories are co-created, within the context 
of a mutually respectful interview, indicates a level of trust and sharing between researcher 
and participants, but even within this setting, a one-off (or short term research/researcher 
engagement) can rarely encourage alternative (possibly painful and uncertain) narratives.  
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(b) Validating the inauthentic narrative in findings/dissemination and co-creation 
When providing rich, thick data, and staying close to the participant voice, the possibility, 
nonetheless for representing an inauthentic voice creeps in. Even if we provide exemplars we 
are in danger of validating the dominant discourse, sometimes by virtue of what is left out. In 
narrative research, for example, there is the inevitable omission of the voices of people who 
refused to participate. Some such instances have usefully unsettled us as researchers - for 
example the rejection (and lost possible alternative narrative) of one non-participant, who 
withdrew ‘because I won’t be that for you’. He was referring to a petri dish, once he had 
heard of the invitation for service users’ accounts and how they were a part of a larger 
research initiative; or the reluctant participant whose frustration itself became the research 
question, once he had yelled ‘this is not a clinical case study – this is my life!’ (Author a, 
2009). In addition, the very imposition of a narrative frame on experience already masks 
meanings. As argued by Charmaz (2002:303), the ‘raw experience of suffering may fit 
neither narrative logic nor the comprehensible content of a story’ – and so that raw 
experience may well be lost within he research frame. 
 
If co-creation is not critiqued, and decentring the author is conflated with ‘anti-expertism’, 
researchers run the risk of validating the inauthentic or even toxic, narratives, of participants. 
It should be noted that we do not interchange ‘toxic’ with negative, nor assume that all 
negative narratives are critically reflective. Rather, we seek to strike a balance between 
inclusion of multiple voices and experiences, and avoid mere relativism or dichotomous 
thinking.   
 
It is all too easy to fall back on the socially approved discourses of positivity, recovery and 
stoicism.  Minimising is a form of comfort, and making sense of the horror of the body 
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(Stacey, 1997). How else to describe burst bowels, breast removal, or suicide attempts and 
the bleak, long painful reality of enduring mental illness?  In one example of such 
minimising, one participant recounted his experience of his bowel rupturing at work and 
being air lifted to hospital:  
 
It’s not so much a terrible experience really.  I don’t feel unlucky or disadvantaged.   
 
And as Lolita commented on her radical disfiguring mastectomy:  
 
Other women had it worse than me, and it made me think how lucky I was.  
 
Extracts from our corpus of first person narratives of people with severe and enduring 
histories of mental ill-health also appear to be minimising experiences of trauma, crisis and 
abuse adopting a ‘what doesn’t kill me makes me stronger’ narrative. 
 
The danger of validating the inauthentic, comes then, in not being sufficiently critically 
interpretive of these comments for fear of disrespecting the participants lived experiences. 
Indeed, research spaces and processes where disavowal of physical pain or emotional and 
psychological distress is implicitly encouraged, may be contributing to a deeper problem, that 
of the continued ‘othering’ of individuals who are not thriving, coping, smiling (Shildrick, 
2002; Ehrenreich, 2010). 
 
Reinforcing and perpetuating the dominant ideologies 
We suggest that the fear of being perceived as negative, not fighting back, and having a 
stigmatised body, unwittingly foreclosed alternative experiences of participants. The 
responsibility to recover and be well may be experienced by some as an empowering spur to 
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self-efficacy, yet some participants went beyond minimising and sought to reduce exposure 
to circumstances that provoked thoughts of their own mortality. When considering support 
groups Ella stated:  
 
Others have much worse experiences and you don’t want to hear about that 
  
and Lolita agreed:  
 
I didn’t want to join a support group as it would be too negative.  
 
 In each sample of the narratives of mental health service users there was a strong 
representation of people like Tanya, who voiced the need to keep away from the ‘whole 
mental health group thing’.  
 
 
Psychosocial cancer researchers are aware that fear of death and the possibility of recurrence 
is a leading concern for our participants (Author b and Endacott, 2010). Again, to collude 
with this normative stance would be to suggest that supportive care and life saving enhancing 
information are to be avoided. As researchers, we would then be perpetuating the dominant 
ideology that cancer experiences and death are to remain unseen, unheard and stigmatised; 
the opposite of our intentions of including participant experience. 
 
Within mental health research, a similar situation prevails whereby participant voice is all too 
easily sequestered into either the limiting and non-agentic narrative of continued stigma; 
pathology and damage, easily denigrated as autopathography - or the potentially equally 
limiting and perhaps falsely agentic narrative of recovery; empowerment; and occasionally, 
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even epiphany through illness; voiced, in one example, (Timmy) who said mental illness had 
given him: 
   ‘wings to fly, man…this thing [circles the head] has shown me the way…’  
While we would not necessarily question experiences felt to be epiphanic, we do wish to 
explore how space and conditions can be better created within such research for alternative 
narratives, even those of silence, relegated by default to those who do not participate.  It has 
been argued, for example that narrative itself is a poor vehicle for expressing mental illness, 
its very tendency to linearity and resolution being ‘inimical to the expression of madness’ 
(Stone 2004:16). First person/patient centred narrative research that perpetuates dominant 
ideologies even unwittingly through its processes can, in this analysis, alarmingly constitute a 
‘kind of violence inflicted on the life narrated’ (Stone, 2004:19). 
 
Discussion 
Within the UK it is now widely endorsed that policy and mental health services embed a 
recovery orientation. In England mental health policy has explicitly supported a recovery 
focus since 2001 (Perkins and Slade, 2012). Within mental health research there is then, 
unsurprisingly, a similar discursive pressure on research participants as that described within 
psychosocial cancer research, to use the language and embedded assumptions of the strongly 
normative recovery or remission paradigms. In our discussion, we consciously conflate the 
recovery paradigm with the remission paradigm, similarly affected by hope and cope, 
discourses integral to the neoliberal agenda (Arxer, et al. 2014). Herein we use the recovery 
paradigm to include the experiences of both people with mental health issues, as well as 
people with cancer, and any convergence between our participants. 
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The recovery discourse persuasively draws on the ubiquitous influence of positive 
psychology and happiness science (Seligman, 2003) whilst disregarding Frank’s (1995) 
critique of the restitution narrative and its limitations.  The recovery discourse appears to 
enable an alternative to the biomedical, offering opportunities to move away from normative 
labels such as, ; schizophrenic; stage 4 tumour; patient; service user; anxious, depressive. It 
may also enable a ‘quest narrative’ (Frank, 1995) or ‘redemption’ narrative (McAdams: 
2001:474) whereby ‘the storyteller depicts a transformation from a bad, affectively negative 
life scene to a subsequent good, affectively positive life scene’.  
 
However, whilst the recovery discourse is based on principles of acceptance and resilience, 
on strategies for living and on hope and empowerment, this apparently life affirming 
narrative can also hold and reproduce what we termed in the findings ‘inauthentic narratives’; 
that is, ‘toxic stories’ that enmesh both narrator and researcher in particular subject positions 
(Sagan, 2010).  Indeed participants in mental health research have alluded to this in speaking 
of the limitations of talking therapy, and being wary and weary of fossilising illness-
dominated identities (Scheff, 1999; Author a, 2012). It has also been noted how personal 
stories from within psychiatric contexts  have  become routinely harnessed to further the 
interests of mental health services with some writers referring to ‘patient porn’ and 
demanding that stories of resistance be reclaimed as tools for socio-political change (Costa, et 
al, 2012). For many service users ‘recovery’  has also become code for cutting support and 
coercing people into employment and indeed has been highly contested, if not entirely 
rejected by the Mad Studies movement as a model still essentially based on an individual 
medicalised model of mental illness (LeFrançois, et al, 2013).  Harper & Speed (2012) in 
their critique of the discourses of recovery and resilience, bring to our attention at least three 
points regarding the infiltration of discourses of recovery. Firstly they argue that the concepts 
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of recovery and resilience are individualistic, based on medicalized and neoliberal notions of 
individual responsibility. Secondly, they suggest that resilience discourse continues to be 
implicitly reliant on a model of deficit, the recovery discourse reframing deficits as strengths. 
Finally, they note that structural inequalities are routinely de-emphasized within the 
neoliberal framework.    
 
We question to what extent the ‘recovery’ discourse is yet another potentially limiting, or 
even toxic/inauthentic narrative, not allowing language for stories of non-recovery and thus 
losing those experiences, in a way that stories of non-compliance have been self-censored 
from participants in the past, thus losing these multi-layered experiences too. In endorsing 
and reproducing these problematics of recovery discourse through our own research, 
respectful as it endeavours to be of first person experience, are we then, not colluding, 
reproducing what Wright (2014) terms ‘toxic positivity’?  
 
We wondered how many of the non-story tellers were burdened or ‘erased’ by pressures of 
the recovery discourse. What happens if, for example, you are not feeling empowered?  If 
you feel that your story does not contain evangelical proclamations of resilience and new 
found strength? That in fact, you are ill and, stuck in a bleak space where you cannot 
communicate, reach out, share, ‘manage’ your symptoms, or even get out of bed. Then how 
do you begin to position yourself in front of a veritable army of survivors, policy makers, and 
professionals all chanting Recovery and Resilience or “Ra Ra Positive” (McGrath, 2004). 
How much more of a ‘deficit’ is your illness now that there is, apparently, a step-wise 
programme of recovery, and you are just not on it?  So it is important to ‘hear’ the silenced 
voices, and be mindful that one positive narrative places another in deficit.   
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Many of our participants had no illusion about the recurrence of mental illness or metastatic 
cancer. Some seemed acutely aware that they shift from one side of this narrative divide to 
the other, and swiftly.  Other are caught in the liminal space of the ‘waiting’ room (Frank, 
1995). They referred to the inconstancy of health, and as one participant, Poonam, put it, of 
how ‘I can say this now because I feel well…can talk to you now…that’s not a given for next 
week, or year…even for tomorrow.’ Recovery, in any of its definitions and manifestations is 
precarious. There is a tendency also, to revere one’s recovery strategies, a tendency that can 
be identified in some of the more zealous accounts; accounts which are so often those 
endorsed within the milieu of self-help culture and positive psychology and used by the 
media, by policy makers and advocates of the neoliberal happiness and wellbeing agenda.   
 
The responsibility to recover and, in the words of one of our participants to ‘speak well-ness’ 
may be experienced by some as an empowering spur to self-efficacy, or at the very least, as a 
language through which to hope. Narrative health research in the past three decades has been 
careful and instrumental in foregrounding this, and in putting the personal experiences of 
health and ill-health squarely on the research table. Yet the lost experiences of those who fail 
to recover; to enter remission; or even stoically narrate their journey to us as interviewers 
may thereby be further stamped with desolation and futility. If such recovery and coping 
narratives are perpetuated in the absence of a range of health resources the recovery 
movement and its allied research unwittingly aligns with the neoliberalisation of healthcare.  
In this model a withdrawal of public provision demands that individuals exercise a growing 
ability to look after themselves and pre-supposes a healthcare system in which there is no 
place and little affordability for the expression of existential crisis.   As argued by Berlant, 
(2011) happiness and health have become objects of political control, as the consumer culture 
begins to demonstrate its wholesale inability to deliver these. 
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 Recommendations: 
When the very language of resistance and user perspective is hijacked, and effectively 
neutered, how can the interview space and our analysis open up other possibilities? We 
propose that in carrying out health research, we as qualitative researchers working in the first 
person narrative tradition re-sensitise ourselves to how we allow for, or disavow emotional 
work (Dickson-Swift, et al 2009) in the interview space; how we enable methodological 
means by which to open up ‘bidirectional communication and intimacy’ (Roer-Strier, & 
Sands, 2015) and that we seek to expand possibilities for: 
 
1) Critical longitudinal work – we consider this to be one possible way to identify subtle 
narrative shifts over time, and a methodological means by which to track the 
emergence of narratives of resistance. We acknowledge however that this work is 
unpopular with funders, resource-hungry and offers few ‘quick wins’ for universities 
highly focussed on REF(able) outputs; 
2) Critique – With pressures on universities and their collaborations to fit the research 
ever more specifically to the funding it can sometimes be a tall order to embed by 
default a critique of the discursive/disciplinary/materialist forces contributing to 
narrative and subject positions within its methodology. Yet we see this as crucial 
even though this may herald an erosion of the status of participant-led findings; 
3) Developing awareness of how to identify possible alternative spaces of dissent (what 
is not being researched; spoken about; blogged; applauded ) and;  
4) Systematically revealing how neoliberal discourses and values have saturated the 
academy, the impact of this on research methodology and the ways in which we think 
and operationalise research within HE. We advocate that Post-Foucauldian 
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governmentality analysis provides a way to address some of these epistemological 
and ethical dilemmas. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
We have offered a Post-Foucauldian governmentality analysis of our own research as a way 
of highlighting accidental and incidental ways in which researchers can fall into neoliberalist 
‘traps’. We have attempted to note specific ‘regimes of truth’, exploring the ways in which 
various modalities of speaking the truth are formed and how empowerment in, and through 
narrative research may be rhetorical, concealing a more insidious stripping of forms of power 
and protection.  
 
We found this confronting, as we consider ourselves reflexive, rigorous, and critical in our 
research methodologies, but also long term adherents to the values of participatory narrative 
research in health, and loyal to feminist onto-epistemological principles that put the voice of 
the participant/patient/user at the heart of our research endeavour.  We also acknowledge that 
we, too, undertake research in Higher Education Institutions, which are also subject to 
neoliberalist imperatives and engaged in their own varied struggles to reassert the university 
as a place of unconditional dialogue, critique and critical resistance (Derrida, 2001.) We do 
not advocate a relinquishing of the narrative interview, nor of the sensitive handling of first 
person narratives in health as a means towards new knowledges, but we do argue that when 
qualitative narrative research is at its best it takes as its very material the ‘unclear’- working 
the terrain of what might otherwise be lost.  For this we need to focus on the ‘surplus’ that is 
so irksome to positivistic research and on the very notion of the ‘outlier’ – making it become 
our core business. In choosing not only to not omit the unclear and the outlier, but instead to 
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work with them, we may avoid the pitfall described by Heisenberg who suggested that when 
research omits all that is unclear, we are left with ‘completely uninteresting and trivial 
tautologies.’ (Heisenberg, 1971:213.) 
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